

MINNESOTA'S 2012 POST-ELECTION AUDIT

Report and Recommendations

June 2013

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Summary

Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota (CEIMN) is a statewide, non-partisan organization, formed in 2004, that advocates for accurate, transparent and verifiable elections in Minnesota and nationally. From 2006 to 2012, CEIMN organized seven statewide non-partisan observations in Minnesota: four post-election audit¹ observations and three recount observations.

Consistent with previous observations, Minnesota's 2012 post-election audit was conducted in an efficient, transparent and accurate manner. Nonpartisan observers expressed high confidence in the integrity and the accuracy of the post-election audit procedures.

Minnesota's post-election audit (where paper ballots are hand counted and the totals are compared to the voting machine totals from Election Day) provides an important check on the accuracy of the optical scanners.² CEIMN advocates that all states implement robust post-election audits³ based on recommended principles and practices.⁴

New developments in 2013 have included the adoption of legislation affecting post-election audits, and plans to replace a substantial number of our aging voting machines.

Background: Post-Election Audits in Minnesota

What is a post-election audit?

A post-election audit, defined for the purposes of this report, refers to hand counting votes on paper ballots and comparing them to the corresponding Election Day voting machine total (henceforth referred to as "machine total"). This is a method to check the accuracy of the machines.

Visit our state audit laws searchable database (http://www.ceimn.org/searchable_databases/state_audit_laws) for a summary of audit laws in every state. Also, a comparison of 40 different audit search fields can be conducted.

¹ Minnesota officially refers to the audit as the "post-election review." CEIMN uses the phrase "post-election audit" which is the terminology most commonly used nationally.

² On Election Day in 2012, there were 82 precincts that did not use voting machines to count their ballots. These hand counted precincts are still eligible for selection for the post-election audit.

³ To learn more about post-election audit laws in other states, visit CEIMN's audit law database at http://www.ceimn.org/searchable_databases/state_audit_laws

⁴ Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits http://electionaudits.org/files/bestpracticesfinal_0.pdf

History of post-election audits in Minnesota.

Minnesota's first post-election audit took place in November 2006. At that time, Minnesota was one of sixteen states requiring a post-election audit. In 2012, there were 26 states that conducted post-election audits.⁵ While some states have stronger post-election audit laws than others, this shift toward an audit requirement is a positive move toward improving the transparency and integrity of elections throughout the United States.

Absentee ballots and precincts.

Before 2010, absentee ballots were delivered to each precinct on Election Day; as a result, the machine total reflected the votes of both in-person voters and absentee voters. Starting in 2010, absentee ballots were processed by an Absentee Ballot Board⁶ at a central location and were not physically delivered to a precinct on Election Day. This means that the absentee ballots are now read by a different machine than the in-person, precinct ballots.

Minnesota's post-election audit law.

After the general election, precincts are selected by lot⁷ by each of the 87 County Canvassing Boards. Elections for Governor, President, U.S. Senator and U.S Representative must be audited when they occur. The number of precincts randomly⁸ selected in each county is based on the total number of people who are registered to vote:

- Fewer than 50,000 registered voters: at least two precincts
- Between 50,000 and 100,000 registered voters: at least three precincts
- Over 100,000 registered voters: at least four precincts, or three percent of the total number of precincts in the county, whichever is greater

⁵ Counting Votes 2012: A State by State Look at Voting Technology Preparedness, p.116. <http://countingvotes.org/> and Verified Voting . <https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/post-election-audits/>

⁶ To learn more about Absentee Ballot Boards, including who is on an Absentee Ballot Board and their duties, refer to Minnesota Statutes, section 203B.23 Absentee Ballot Board. <https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=203B.23> and 203B.121 Ballot Boards <https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=203B.121>

⁷ Minnesota Statutes., section 206.89, Postelection review of voting systems, sub 2 <https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=206.89>

⁸ This document will refer to the selection "by lot" within counties as a "random selection," even though the selection does include the nonrandom requirement that at least one selected precinct in each county must have had more than 150 votes cast in the general election.

In some states, audits are conducted after election results are finalized, meaning that if an error is found, no corrective action is taken. This is not the case in Minnesota. The hand counted audit results are incorporated into the official results.

In addition, an audit can trigger more audits and can eventually lead to a recount. For example, if the results of the audit in one of the precincts “reveals a difference greater than one-half of one percent, or greater than two votes in a precinct where 400 or fewer voters cast ballots, the postelection review official must, within two days, conduct an additional review of the races...in at least three precincts in the same jurisdiction where the discrepancy was discovered.”⁹ The statute then outlines a continuum of audit escalation. If the machine error rate exceeds the specified threshold, it will trigger an additional round of audits which could eventually trigger a recount. However, if the error(s) are attributed to voter intent, the official results are changed but no escalation occurs as noted in MS 206.89 sub 4:

Valid votes that have been marked by the voter outside the vote targets or using a manual marking device that cannot be read by the voting system must not be included in making the determination whether the voting system has met the standard of acceptable performance for any precinct.¹⁰

Transparency.

The public can observe the random selection of precincts to be audited as well as the counting of the ballots. Starting in 2006, Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota has organized four statewide non-partisan observations of post-election audits throughout Minnesota. Three of these observations were done in partnership with the League of Women Voters.

⁹ Minnesota Statutes, section 206.89, Postelection review of voting systems, sub 5
<https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=206.89>

¹⁰ Minnesota Statutes, section 206.89, Postelection review of voting systems, sub 4
<https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=206.89>

New Developments

Legislative changes in 2013 to Minnesota's post-election audit law.

Auditing absentee ballots.

Starting in 2010, absentee ballots have been fed through a machine at a central location by an Absentee Ballot Board (ABB).¹¹ In both the 2010 and 2012 post-election audits, ballots counted centrally by an ABB were considered to be one precinct for the purpose of a post-election audit. These precincts were eligible for the random selection of the post-election audit. Since some ABB precincts are extremely large (for example, Minneapolis had 15,143 voters in its 2012 ABB precinct), there was a possibility that one of these very large precincts could be selected for auditing. This possibility was eliminated in legislation passed in 2013. The new legislation states that the ballots to be reviewed for a precinct include both the ballots counted at the polling place for that precinct and the absentee ballots counted centrally by a ballot board for that precinct.¹² CEIMN supports this new legislation because it has the potential to reduce the workload of election administrators while ensuring that absentee ballots will continue to be audited by being combined with the precinct ballots.

Post-election audits no longer required when the audited race is recounted.

In 2008, some of the ballots were hand-counted twice for the U.S. Senate race—once for the post-election audit and once for the U.S. Senate recount. Similarly, some of the ballots were hand-counted twice in 2010 for the gubernatorial race. New legislation in 2013 means that election officials are no longer required to audit a race that will be recounted.¹³ CEIMN supports this change, recognizing that there is no need to hand count a race twice.

Change in audit dates.

The county canvass of a general election occurs between the third and tenth day following the election. New legislation in 2013 requires that the post-election audit must not begin before the eleventh day after the state general election and must be completed no later than the 18th day

¹¹ Prior to 2010, absentee ballots were processed at the precinct.

¹² Session Laws of Minnesota 2013, Chapter 131, article 2, section 69
<https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/?id=131&doctype=Chapter&year=2013&type=0>

¹³ Session Laws of Minnesota 2013, Chapter 131, article 2, section 70

after the state general election.¹⁴ This ensures that the post-election audit is conducted in a timely manner but not before the completion of the canvass of the general election. By the eleventh day after the election, the possibility of a recount would be apparent, and counties can proceed with the necessary post-election audits while omitting the auditing of races that will be recounted.

New voting equipment.

Several counties and cities in Minnesota are planning to purchase new voting equipment during 2013-2014. These include Anoka, Dakota, Hennepin, Scott, Ramsey and Washington Counties, and the City of Duluth. These regions contain more than 50% of the registered voters in Minnesota.

Although most of these counties have yet to select new equipment, Hennepin and Anoka Counties have completed their selection. They have selected the vendor Election System and Software (ES&S) along with its DS200 precinct scanner and tabulator and its DS850 central scanner and tabulator. Hennepin County is planning on using their new equipment in the August 2013 primary elections in the cities of Bloomington, St Louis Park, and Minnetonka. Anoka County is planning on using their new equipment in November of 2013.

2012 Post-election Audit

Total number of precincts audited per county.

The total number of precincts audited is based on the total number of registered voters (see Appendix A), not the total number of precincts or machines used within a county. For counties that have over 100,000 registered voters, at least four precincts, or three percent of the total number of precincts in the county, whichever is greater, are audited. The following counties have over 100,000 registered voters:

1. Anoka (195,342 registered voters), 127 precincts
2. Dakota (239,999 registered voters), 140 precincts
3. Hennepin (678,018 registered voters), 405 precincts
4. Ramsey (279,596 registered voters), 172 precincts
5. St. Louis (124,874 registered voters), 177 precincts
6. Washington (151,186 registered voters), 89 precincts

¹⁴ Session Laws of Minnesota 2013, Chapter 131, article 2, section 69

In 2012, a total of 205 precincts were randomly selected to be audited throughout Minnesota. Seventy-three counties (or 84 percent of all counties) audited two precincts. Of those seventy-three counties, the total percent of precincts audited varied from 2.2 percent (Otter Tail County) to 15.4 percent (Cook County). The remaining number of audits in each county follows:

- Three precincts (eight counties)
 - Wright (7 percent of all precincts)
 - Wadena (12 percent of all precincts)
 - Sterns (3 percent of all precincts)
 - Sherburne (8.6 percent of all precincts)
 - Scott (6.5 percent of all precincts)
 - Olmsted (3.6 percent of all precincts)
 - Meeker (10 percent of all precincts)
 - Carver (8.6 percent of all precincts)
- Four precincts (three counties)
 - Washington (4.5 percent of all precincts)
 - Dakota (2.9 percent of all precincts)
 - Anoka (3.2 percent of all precincts)
- Five precincts (two counties)
 - St. Louis (2.8 percent of all precincts)
 - Ramsey (2.9 percent of all precincts)
- Thirteen precincts
 - Hennepin County (3.2 percent of all precincts)

Total number of ballots counted for the audit.

There were just over 2.95 million ballots cast in the November 2012 general election in Minnesota. Of those ballots, 125,870 (4.3%) were hand counted for the post-election audit (see Appendix B for a detailed statistical breakdown by county).

Absentee Ballot Boards

In 2012, the processing of absentee ballots occurred at a central location by an Absentee Ballot Board (ABB) rather than at the local precinct. ABBs are composed of election judges, deputy county auditors, or deputy city clerks who have received training in the processing and counting of absentee ballots. Their duties include accepting or rejecting the return envelopes as well as opening accepted envelopes and placing the ballot in the machine.¹⁵

¹⁵ More details about their duties, including what occurs if an absentee ballot envelop is rejected, can be found at Minnesota Statutes, section 203B.23, Absentee Ballot Board. <https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=203B.23>

Absentee ballot boards randomly selected.

In 2012, ABB precincts were included in the random selection of precincts to be audited. Seven of the 205 precincts selected were ABB precincts. This is 3.4 % of the total precincts audited. A total of 10,752 absentee ballots were audited representing 8.5% of all of the ballots audited.

County/City Absentee Ballot Board	Total number of hand counted absentee ballots
Dodge	715
Douglas	2451
Hennepin/Wayzata	489
Ramsey/North St. Paul	492
Ramsey/Shoreview	1985
Sherburne	3791
Wright/Buffalo	829

Table 1

Note: When counties are large, they are split into city ABB precincts.

Types of precincts selected to be audited.

In 2012, there were 4,102 polling place precincts in Minnesota. Five hundred fifty-five (13.5%) of these precincts were mail-in precincts, and 3,547 (86.5%) were in-person precincts. Of these 4,102 precincts in Minnesota, 205 were audited, representing 5% of the total. Twenty-two (10.7%) of the 205 audited precincts were mail-in precincts and 176 (85.9%) were in-person precincts, representing a random selection of precincts close to the actual percentages of the in-person and mail-in precincts in the state.

In addition to the polling place precincts, there were 179 absentee ballot board precincts in 2012. Seven of these ABB precincts were audited, representing 3.9% of the total number of ABB precincts.

Audit Reporting

Differing ballot counts within the same precinct.

The hand counting of three races was part of the 2012 audit. This means that for each precinct the same pile of ballots was counted three times — once for the Presidential race, once for the U.S. Representative race, and once for the U.S. Senate race.

The total number of ballots hand counted for each of the three races should be the same; however, in 2012, eight counties (10 precincts total) reported a discrepancy among the ballot counts (not vote counts) for the three audited races. These counts were usually off by one ballot; however, there were three precincts where the reported hand count differed by five to eight ballots. Of the 205 precincts audited, 4.9% had inconsistencies in the ballot count among the three audited races (see recommendation # 2).

Review ballots--voter intent.

A post-election audit is a method to check the accuracy of a voting machine. Machines are only able to determine voter intent if voters appropriately fill in the ovals on a ballot. If the voter does not appropriately fill in the oval, such as circling rather than filling in the oval, the machine will not be able to accurately count the ballot.

In reviewing the post-election audit report forms, it was determined that the majority of changes were due to mismarked ballots where the voter intent was clear. Here are examples from 14 different counties:

1. Wilkin County, Breckenridge P-1: U.S. Senate race and U.S. Representative races
 - Blank for office changed to write-in with the explanation, “voter wrote in name but not the oval”
2. Watonwan County, St. James City W-1: U.S. Representative Race
 - Allen Quist, audited totals provided him with one more vote with the explanation that “defective ballot for Quist,” while the “over/ defective for office” section had one less vote with the note, “Both ovals completed, Walz crossed out, Quist written in on write in space, oval not completed in write-in”
 - Blank for office, audited totals had one more vote (and the write-in had one less vote) with the explanation, “write-in oval filled but no candidate entered” and “oval completed no candidate entered”
 - Over/defective for office changed
3. Wabasha County, Lake Township: U.S. Senate race
 - Blank for office changed to Kurt Bills with the explanation, “voter intent light mark”

4. Traverse County, Wheaton, P2: U.S. Representative race
 - Blank for office changed to Colin Peterson with the explanation, “voter intent blank changed to Peterson”
5. Todd County, Bruce Township: U.S. Senate race
 - Eight votes shifted to write-in from blank for office with the explanation, “write-ins ovals not filled in”
6. St. Louis County, Ely: U.S. Representative race
 - Blank for office shifted to Chip Cravaack with the explanation, “voter intent outside of oval/vote for Cravaack outside of oval”
7. Ramsey County, Shoreview Absentee Ballot Board, Shoreview P3: U.S. Senate race
 - Blank for office shifted to Amy Klobuchar with the explanation that “target not filled in” and “determined voter intent”
8. Murray County, Slayton City: both U.S. Senate and U.S. Representative races
 - Blank for office changed to write in with the explanation, “write in oval not filled, machine counted as blank”
9. Lake of the Woods, 3-A, UNORG: U.S. Representative race
 - Blank for office changed to vote for Collin Peterson with the explanation, “very light mark-did not pick up vote”
10. Hennepin County, Minneapolis, W4 P5: U.S. Senate race
 - Blank for office changed to vote for Amy Klobuchar with the note, “voter intent”
11. Douglas County, Absentee Ballot Board, Alexandria W4: U.S. Senate
 - Over/defective for office changed to vote for Amy Klobuchar with the note, “Not overvote---is a vote for Klobuchar—voter crossed out Kurt Bills”
12. Dodge County, Absentee Ballot Board, Hayfield: U.S. Representative race
 - Blank for Office changed to vote for Allen Quist with the explanation, “voter intent was very light blue pen” and “light blue pen mark in the oval—machine could not read it”
13. Dakota County, Burnsville, P5: U.S. Senate race
 - Blank for office changed to vote for Amy Klobuchar, with the explanation, “to Klobuchar, voter intent from blank”
14. Carver County, Chaska, W2: U.S. Representative race
 - Blank for office changed to vote for Erik Paulsen with the explanation of “check mark (voter intent) read as blank by tabulator”

Again, these are just some examples of reasons why the vote count changed after the audited hand count. All votes that were changed were moved from either “blank for office,” “over/defective for office” or “write-in.” The explanations were primarily connected to voter intent.

Direct Observations

Training: assuring that observations are nonpartisan and accurate.

CEIMN has a strong commitment to non-partisan and accurate observations. Therefore, all volunteers had to sign a Code of Conduct¹⁶ and attend a training session. Since CEIMN's volunteers are located both in the Twin Cities area and in greater Minnesota, most of CEIMN's trainings were conducted over the telephone. The trainings included a review of the Code of Conduct and the questionnaire. The volunteers were reminded that they had to base all their reports on actual observations and not rumors, and that they were to remain strictly impartial with their observations.

Deployment of volunteers.

In 2012, CEIMN deployed nonpartisan volunteers to observe the post-election audit in 23 counties and cities.¹⁷ This was significantly fewer observations than in previous audits. There are three primary reasons for this: First, CEIMN was involved with educating others on the impact of the Elections Constitutional Amendment and consequently had a limited capacity to prepare for the post-election audit; secondly, CEIMN's staffing was reduced by 50% when compared to the previous post-election audit conducted in 2010; and finally, for the first time, CEIMN did not partner with the League of Women Voters for the post-election audit.

General observations.

Although the limited data do not allow the statistical analyses we have reported in the past, there are some observations we can make about the 2012 post-election audits (see Appendix C for survey questions).

The audits started promptly with a maximum delay of 15 minutes. They were well organized and continued to be adequately staffed. Most observers rated highly the transparency of the audit process and the accommodations made for observers. Our volunteers reported high confidence in the integrity of the post-election audit and the accuracy of the hand counted and election-day machine totals. As one observer said, "It has made me proud of the way we conduct elections in Minnesota."

¹⁶ The Code of Conduct CEIMN uses is based on the *Code of Conduct for International Election Observers*, Commemorated October 27, 2005, at the United Nations, New York, which has been endorsed by over 20 groups including United States Association of Former Members of Congress (USAFMC), National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR).

¹⁷ In 2010, Hennepin County had a centralized location for its post-election audit while in 2012, 2008 and 2006 the post-election audits were conducted in cities within Hennepin County.

Recommendations

1) Chain of Custody:

All observers who observed the delivery of the ballots reported that the envelope/container seals were intact. Most observers reported that ballots were delivered to the audit location (counting location) by at least two individuals. However, observers reported that four counties transported ballots to or from the audit location in the custody of only one person.

CEIMN recommends that ballots be under the observation of at least two election officials at all times during the audit, including during transport and counting.

2) Reconciling ballot counts across all audited races:

In 2012, eight counties reported a discrepancy among the ballot counts (not vote counts) for the three audited races. These counts were usually off by one ballot; however, there were three precincts where the reported hand count differed by five to eight ballots. These discrepancies should not occur since the same ballots are counted for each race.

CEIMN recommends that election officials recount the ballots if the total number of ballots cast for each audited race does not add up to the same number.

3) Absentee Ballots:

One observer reported that there were several false overvotes among the absentee ballots because the ballots were folded and had a crease through one of the ovals. The crease registered as a second vote in a few cases. Although the optical scanner recorded these as overvotes, voter intent was clear during the hand count of the audit. If optical scanners are recording overvotes due to the crease through the ovals, it is also possible that they could record votes where a voter left a contest blank.

The post-election audit is primarily a check on the accuracy of the machines. However, in this case, an observer noticed what might be a problem in the process, the folding of the absentee ballots through the ovals.

CEIMN recommends that ballot design and folding avoid creating folds through the ovals.

Appendix A.

Voter Registration Counts by County (Oct. 26, 2012)

Source: Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State

County	Registered Voters
Aitkin	9,993
Anoka	195,342
Becker	18,262
Beltrami	24,650
Benton	21,033
Big Stone	3,447
Blue Earth	37,856
Brown	14,581
Carlton	19,930
Carver	55,347
Cass	18,175
Chippewa	6,694
Chisago	31,182
Clay	31,634
Clearwater	4,649
Cook	3,534
Cottonwood	6,309
Crow Wing	37,962
Dakota	239,999
Dodge	11,170
Douglas	23,299
Faribault	8,671
Fillmore	12,156
Freeborn	17,944
Goodhue	27,707
Grant	3,872
Hennepin	678,018
Houston	11,811
Hubbard	12,707
Isanti	21,695
Itasca	26,653
Jackson	6,034
Kanabec	9,256
Kandiyohi	23,555
Kittson	2,700
Koochiching	7,287

Lac Qui Parle	4,445
Lake	7,323
Lake Of The Woods	2,500
Le Sueur	16,229
Lincoln	3,399
Lyon	13,694
McLeod	20,224
Mahnomen	2,686
Marshall	4,976
Martin	12,112
Meeker	13,517
Mille Lacs	14,624
Morrison	18,000
Mower	20,355
Murray	5,035
Nicollet	20,175
Nobles	9,166
Norman	3,618
Olmsted	84,009
Otter Tail	34,843
Pennington	7,192
Pine	15,444
Pipestone	5,071
Polk	16,027
Pope	6,954
Ramsey	279,596
Red Lake	2,307
Redwood	9,486
Renville	8,777
Rice	35,819
Rock	5,162
Roseau	8,590
St. Louis	124,874
Scott	75,209
Sherburne	48,626
Sibley	8,448
Stearns	85,590
Steele	20,458
Stevens	6,223
Swift	5,525
Todd	13,163
Traverse	2,167
Wabasha	12,997
Wadena	7,613
Waseca	10,824
Washington	151,186
Watonwan	5,600

Wilkin	3,516
Winona	29,394
Wright	70,590
Yellow Medicine	5,872
Total	3,084,344

Appendix B.

2012 Post-Election Audit—County Statistics

County	Number of precincts	Number of voters	Average number of voters per precinct	Number of audited precincts	Number of ballots counted for audit	% of precincts audited	Ballots counted for audit as a % of ballots cast
Aitkin	54	9,219	171	2	410	3.70%	4.45%
Anoka	127	187,085	1,473	4	6,424	3.15%	3.43%
Becker	48	16,471	343	2	558	4.17%	3.39%
Beltrami	62	22,189	358	2	431	3.23%	1.94%
Benton	27	19,755	732	2	1,522	7.41%	7.70%
Big Stone	23	2,816	122	2	228	8.70%	8.10%
Blue Earth	53	34,463	650	2	3,478	3.77%	10.09%
Brown	32	14,030	438	2	388	6.25%	2.77%
Carlton	39	18,545	476	2	836	5.13%	4.51%
Carver	35	53,079	1,517	3	6,636	8.57%	12.50%
Cass	73	16,211	222	2	662	2.74%	4.08%
Chippewa	24	6,248	260	2	498	8.33%	7.97%
Chisago	23	29,578	1,286	2	2,272	8.70%	7.68%
Clay	57	29,032	509	2	349	3.51%	1.20%
Clearwater	29	4,231	146	2	217	6.90%	5.13%
Cook	13	3,343	257	2	472	15.38%	14.12%
Cottonwood	29	5,916	204	2	111	6.90%	1.88%
Crow Wing	64	35,067	548	2	485	3.13%	1.38%
Dakota	140	231,571	1,654	4	5,544	2.86%	2.39%
Dodge	22	10,399	473	2	806	9.09%	7.75%
Douglas	37	21,114	571	2	2,549	5.41%	12.07%
Faribault	33	7,771	235	2	245	6.06%	3.15%
Fillmore	37	10,946	296	2	270	5.41%	2.47%
Freeborn	40	16,817	420	2	550	5.00%	3.27%
Goodhue	40	25,923	648	2	1,391	5.00%	5.37%
Grant	23	3,509	153	2	305	8.70%	8.69%
Hennepin	405	682,764	1,686	13	18,348	3.21%	2.69%
Houston	27	10,517	390	2	323	7.41%	3.07%

County	Number of precincts	Number of voters	Average number of voters per precinct	Number of audited precincts	Number of ballots counted for audit	% of precincts audited	Ballots counted for audit as a % of ballots cast
Hubbard	38	11,616	306	2	383	5.26%	3.30%
Isanti	18	20,316	1,129	2	1,209	11.11%	5.95%
Itasca	80	24,060	301	2	411	2.50%	1.71%
Jackson	28	5,499	196	2	267	7.14%	4.86%
Kanabec	20	8,188	409	2	608	10.00%	7.43%
Kandiyohi	48	21,546	449	2	1,799	4.17%	8.35%
Kittson	39	2,452	63	2	373	5.13%	15.21%
Koochiching	22	6,514	296	2	333	9.09%	5.11%
Lac Qui Parle	29	4,007	138	2	765	6.90%	19.09%
Lake	19	6,855	361	2	1,240	10.53%	18.09%
Lake Of The Woods	17	2,247	132	2	240	11.76%	10.68%
Le Sueur	27	14,866	551	2	929	7.41%	6.25%
Lincoln	20	3,148	157	2	658	10.00%	20.90%
Lyon	33	12,461	378	2	318	6.06%	2.55%
Mahnomen	19	2,200	116	2	256	10.53%	11.64%
Marshall	61	4,935	81	2	530	3.28%	10.74%
Martin	37	11,039	298	2	626	5.41%	5.67%
McLeod	28	18,650	666	2	1,050	7.14%	5.63%
Meeker	30	12,311	410	3	1,070	10.00%	8.69%
Mille Lacs	25	13,179	527	2	665	8.00%	5.05%
Morrison	48	16,837	351	2	1,545	4.17%	9.18%
Mower	39	18,675	479	2	457	5.13%	2.45%
Murray	29	4,815	166	2	1,108	6.90%	23.01%
Nicollet	28	18,453	659	2	975	7.14%	5.28%
Nobles	40	8,600	215	2	337	5.00%	3.92%
Norman	33	3,253	99	2	173	6.06%	5.32%
Olmsted	84	78,681	937	3	2,933	3.57%	3.73%
Otter Tail	91	31,835	350	2	598	2.20%	1.88%
Pennington	31	6,563	212	2	874	6.45%	13.32%
Pine	48	14,089	294	2	322	4.17%	2.29%
Pipestone	22	4,682	213	2	234	9.09%	5.00%
Polk	82	14,782	180	2	274	2.44%	1.85%
Pope	31	6,285	203	2	256	6.45%	4.07%
Ramsey	172	280,010	1,628	5	6,408	2.91%	2.29%

County	Number of precincts	Number of voters	Average number of voters per precinct	Number of audited precincts	Number of ballots counted for audit	% of precincts audited	Ballots counted for audit as a % of ballots cast
Red Lake	21	2,004	95	2	271	9.52%	13.52%
Redwood	43	7,847	182	2	453	4.65%	5.77%
Renville	38	7,762	204	2	284	5.26%	3.66%
Rice	31	32,415	1,046	2	1,819	6.45%	5.61%
Rock	24	4,874	203	2	192	8.33%	3.94%
Roseau	44	7,414	169	2	380	4.55%	5.13%
Scott	46	71,965	1,564	3	3,753	6.52%	5.22%
Sherburne	35	46,708	1,335	3	5,186	8.57%	11.10%
Sibley	25	7,868	315	2	665	8.00%	8.45%
St. Louis	177	116,221	657	5	3,671	2.82%	3.16%
Stearns	100	78,926	789	3	2,212	3.00%	2.80%
Steele	26	19,228	740	2	1,507	7.69%	7.84%
Stevens	26	5,683	219	2	482	7.69%	8.48%
Swift	30	5,407	180	2	204	6.67%	3.77%
Todd	40	11,867	297	2	439	5.00%	3.70%
Traverse	20	1,869	93	2	502	10.00%	26.86%
Wabasha	33	11,847	359	2	355	6.06%	3.00%
Wadena	25	6,853	274	3	450	12.00%	6.57%
Waseca	22	9,831	447	2	786	9.09%	8.00%
Washington	89	142,556	1,602	4	5,475	4.49%	3.84%
Watonwan	21	5,179	247	2	964	9.52%	18.61%
Wilkin	32	3,240	101	2	647	6.25%	19.97%
Winona	49	27,399	559	2	845	4.08%	3.08%
Wright	43	68,103	1,584	3	7,644	6.98%	11.22%
Yellow Medicine	30	5,456	182	2	152	6.67%	2.79%
Column Averages			719			5.00%	4.27%
Totals	4,102	2,950,780		205	125,870		

Appendix C.

2012 Post-Election Audit Survey Questions

1. Arrival time of CEIMN audit observers.

2. Observer information.

Observer 1: Name, email, and phone number.

Observer 2: Name, email, and phone number.

3. Onsite audit supervisor information.

Name:

Title:

Phone number:

4. Start time of the meeting/procedures. (This differs from the start time of the counting. The procedures may include transferring ballots and/or announcing the process/procedures.)

Scheduled start time:

Actual start time:

5. If the actual start time and the scheduled start time differ, please explain/describe.

6. Transfer of ballots and ballot envelope container seals.

A. Did you observe the transfer of the ballots?

B. Were the ballots delivered to the audit locations by at least two individuals?

C. Were the ballot envelopes/container seals intact when they were delivered?

D. If you did not observe the transfer of the ballots, were the ballot envelopes/container seals intact when you arrived?

Please provide details regarding this observation.

7. In the previous question, you were asked if the seals were intact. If you answered “did not observe” is this because you were restricted from confirming the seals were intact?

Please provide more details about why you were not able to observe if the seals were intact or not.

8. Were the ballots under the observation of at least two election officials at all times?

If you answered no, please describe or explain.

9. Audit procedures (By checking each box, it means that you did observe an item. You may check more than one box.)

Yes, audit procedures were announced out loud.

Yes, we could clearly hear the announcement.

Yes, the procedures were announced before the counting began.

Do you have a specific observation about this? If so, please describe.

10. People present (In some locations, the total number of people present may change while you are observing. We are trying to learn the most number of people in the room as well as the least number of people in the room. Start counting after the meeting has started and before the meeting has ended.)

At the maximum, how many people were present (including election staff, non-CEIMN observers, the media, etc.)?

At the minimum, how many people were present (including election staff, non-CEIMN observers, the media, etc.)?

At the maximum, how many elections staff were present?

At the minimum, how many elections staff were present?

At the maximum, how many political party/candidate representatives were present?

At the minimum, how many political party/candidate representatives were present?

11. Other people in the room. In the question above, you provided numbers for elections staff and individuals representing political parties/ candidates. Were there others in the room?

If you answered yes, please describe (was it a school group, members of the media, interested citizens?)

12. Was there enough room for the elections staff, including the people counting, to work effectively?

If you answered no, please describe/explain.

13. Was there enough room for observers?

14. Did anyone try to hinder the process?

If you answered yes, please describe who they represented, how they were trying to hinder the process, who resolved the issue and how it was resolved.

15. Ballot counting

What time did ballot counting start?

16. If there was a delay between the meeting start time and the time the counting started, please explain/describe.

17. Please let us know if you observed regular precinct ballots, absentee ballot board ballots or, if you observed more than one precinct, if at least one precinct you observed was an absentee ballot board.

Question 18-19 are duplicates.

20. Regular ballot (not absentee ballot board) counting teams. If you only observed Absentee ballot boards, skip this question.

How many people were on counting team 1?

How many people were on counting team 2? (enter 0 if there was only one counting team)

How many people were on counting team 3? (enter 0 if there was only one counting team)

How many people were on counting team 4? (enter 0 if there was only one counting team)

Please describe the duties of each person on the counting team.

21. Absentee ballot board counting teams. (If you did not observe absentee ballot boards, skip this question.)

How many people were on counting team 1?

How many people were on counting team 2? (enter 0 if there was only one counting team)

How many people were on counting team 3? (enter 0 if there was only one counting team)

How many people were on counting team 4? (enter 0 if there was only one counting team)

Please describe the duties of each person on the counting team.

22. Counting procedure (for both absentee and regular precincts).

A. Was the piling method used? (The piling method refers to the sorting and stacking of ballots)

B. Did the counters check the accuracy of each other's work?

C. Did election officials follow a 2-person protocol to sort ballots?

D. Were all team members present when the count totals were entered onto forms?

E. Did it appear as if the number of ballots in each pile was counted accurately?

F. Did any issues arise that slowed down or delayed the counting of the ballots?

If there were delays, please provide details. If you answered no to questions A-E or if you answered yes to question F, please describe/explain.

23. Blind counting. (To blind count, one must not know how many ballots were reported on Election Day, both the total number of ballots and the number of votes for specific races.

A. Were counting teams kept unaware of official results during the audit?

B. Was there a discrepancy between Election Day results and the hand counted audited results?

C. If there was a discrepancy, did the counters remain 'blind' (didn't know total number of ballots cast or number of votes cast for a specific race), while others tried to determine a reason for the difference?

If there was a discrepancy between the machine totals and the hand counted totals, please describe the actions of the elections officials.

24. Time the last ballot was counted.

25. After the ballots were counted, were they returned to their proper envelopes/containers?

26. Were the ballot envelopes/containers resealed?

Yes, one elections staff did it; no other elections staff were present.

Yes, at least two elections staff were present.

No, they were not resealed.

27. Official audit forms.

A. Were the counting team(s) totals accurately recorded on the audit form?

B. Were copies of the official audit forms made available to the public?

28. If the counting method, the number of counters, or other factors differed from precinct to precinct, please describe/explain the differences.

29. Optical Scanner tapes.

A. Were you able to see the Election Day optical scanner tape?

B. If you were able to see the optical scanner tape, could you confirm information (i.e. precinct name/number, date/time)?

C. If you were to see the optical scanner tape, were the Election Day vote totals accurately recorded on the report forms?

Do you have additional information about this part of your observation?

30. Did election officials indicate that a further audit was needed?

Do you have additional information about this observation?

31. What time did the entire audit process, including counting and writing down the results end?

32. As a TEAM, rate the following:

- A. The way the room was laid out.
- B. Organization of the auditing.
- C. Integrity of the counting method.
- D. Accuracy of the Election Day machine results.
- E. Accuracy of the hand counted audit results.
- F. Reporting of the audit results.
- G. Transparency/observability of the process.
- H. Conduct of the elections staff.
- I. Conduct of the observers or other non-elections staff.
- J. The training you received from CEIMN.

Please use this space to provide greater details, both good and bad, about your observations.

33. How has observing the post-election audit impacted your understanding of Minnesota's elections?

34. Do you have ideas about other election integrity work that CEIMN might be interested in?

In Memory of
Ken Paddock
1938-2013

CEIMN volunteer and dear friend

CEIMN would like to thank our many nonpartisan observation volunteers
for their time and commitment to election integrity.



Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota (www.ceimn.org) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that advocates for verifiable, transparent, and accurate elections in Minnesota and across the country.